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EMINENT DOMAIN AND REDEVELOPMENT:
THE RETURN OF ENGINE CHARLIE*
Barry Bennett**
In May, 1981, groundbreaking began for a General Motors (GM) factory
on the site of what had been a Polish neighborhood in Detroit. Bulldozers
had been razing the area for months. In Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit,' the Michigan Supreme Court, citing the economic revitali-
zation and additional employment opportunities the factory was expected to
generate, upheld the city's condemnation of the land for sale to GM as a
valid exercise of the eminent domain power. It asserted that the benefit to
GM's private interest was "incidental." 2
Private entities, or governmental units acting on their behalf, have long
been granted eminent domain privileges when necessary for the economic
development of an area. The granting of these privileges has been based
upon the well-established constitutional doctrine that private property can
be condemned by eminent domain for a public use.3 Recent condemnations,
however, have allowed redevelopment of distressed areas by widening the
scope of the eminent domain power through a redefinition of the concept
of "public use."
The judicial practice of allowing condemnations when the benefit to a
private enterprise is incidental to a primary public purpose is not a new
one." Poletown, however, is the first case that permitted a condemnation of
private property so that an existing local industry could acquire land for its
* Engine Charlie is Charles Wilson, former General Motors executive, who made the
famous statement that what's good for General Motors is good for the country.
** Assistant Attorney General, Oregon Department of Justice; J.D., Harvard University.
1. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
2. Id. at 634-35, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
3. See 2A P. NICHOLS, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.1, at 7-4.1 & n.l (J. Sackman &
R. VanBrunt rev. 3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]. See generally Berger, The Public
Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 ORE. L. REV. 203 (1978) (addressing the question of
under what circumstances should a governmental or private party have the right to condemn
the property of another); Mandelker, Public Purpose in Urban Redevelopment, 28 TUL. L.
REV. 96 (1953) (considering the definitions of public use or public purpose as these concepts
arise in connection with the power conferred on the designated local public agency to acquire
blighted areas through the exercise of the eminent domain power); Nichols, The Meaning of
Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REV. 615 (1940) ("It is settled law in
every American court today that private property may not be taken by eminent domain except
for a public use. . . .") [hereinafter cited as Public Use]; Comment, The Public Use Limitation
on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949) (traces the history of the
narrow "use by the public" test as a limitation on the eminent domain power and concludes
that the Supreme Court has repudiated the doctrine of public use).
4. See NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.222[1]-[5], at 7-52 & n.l.
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own expansion. Detroit justified the condemnation of Poletown as the only
way to provide economic stimulus to a depressed area. This Article will ex-
plore whether this justification was valid. In so doing, the Article first
traces the history of the use of eminent domain for economic and regional
development, and then analyzes Poletown in light of past exercises of the
power and the need for redevelopment in Detroit. The Article finally sug-
gests possible solutions to urban crises to prevent the destruction of future
Poletowns.
EMERGENCE OF THE DOCTRINE-NINETEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS
Manufacturing Concerns
The earliest uses of eminent domain in America, necessary for the devel-
opment of the country and its natural resources, were rights of way for
roads and flowage easements for mills.' Most states passed mill acts which
allowed mill owners to flood neighboring land in operation of their mills. 6
The courts upheld the acts because the mills were required to be open to the
public for the grinding of corn.' Roads could be cut through private prop-
erty as long as they too were open to the public. The narrow view of public
use which thus emerged defined the term literally: unless the public had an
actual right to use the property after it was taken, the condemnation was
impermissibly private.'
As the country became more industrialized and manufacturing establish-
ments sought to use the mill acts to build mills which would not be open
for general public use, the need for a broader definition of public use be-
came apparent.9 The public necessity for mills and roads led most courts to
uphold condemnations even when a mill was wholly private or a road was
5. See Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law,
1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248, 270-78 (1973) ("the various acts to encourage the construc-
tion of mills offer some of the earliest illustrations of American willingness to sacrifice the
sanctity of private property in the interest of promoting economic development") [hereinafter
cited as Horwitz]; Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11
ENVTL. L. 1, 13-15 (1980) (the development of the eminent domain doctrine followed the
development of the land and the first recorded uses of the doctrine were for building roads)
[hereinafter cited as Meidinger]; Public Use, supra note 3, at 617 (the few situations which ex-
isted in early America where eminent domain was needed were for rights of way for roads and
flowage easements for mills).
6. The general mill acts which existed in the majority of states are compiled in Head v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1885). These acts authorized private lands to be taken
and flooded by the erection and maintenance of water mills and mill-dams upon any non-
navigable stream. Owners of flooded lands were paid proper damages. Id. at 16.
7. See Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain & the Concept of Public Purpose
in the State Courts, 5 PERSP. IN Am. HIST. 329, 371 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Scheiber].
8. See NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.2[l], at 7-22. The narrow view of public use implies the
-"use of many" or "by the public". The use must be in common and not for a particular in-
dividual.
9. Id. § 7.623; Horwitz, supra note 5, at 273.
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built merely to provide private access to the builder's land.'" These courts de-
fined public use as public advantage or benefit. Anything substantially con-
tributing to the public welfare by promoting the growth of industries or the
development of an area was a permissible public use."
Illustrative of early cases applying this broad view of public use is Scudder
v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co.'2 In Scudder, a New Jersey court found that
the development of the community's resources and the stimulus to its econ-
omy were public purposes that would allow a company chartered to supply
water for manufacturing to condemn private land. The court noted that the
water power created "[would] be sufficient for the erection of seventy mills,
and factories, and other works . . ." and rejected the argument that the
public must have a right to use it:" "[tihe ever varying condition of society
is constantly presenting new objects of public importance and utility; and
what . . . [is] a public use or benefit, may depend somewhat on the situa-
tion and wants of the community for the time being.""'
The community need for additional employment encouraged other courts
to adopt the broad public use definition. In Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp.
v. Newman," the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the appli-
cation of the commonwealth's mill act to a manufacturing corporation. The
court found a permissible public use when the citizens of a community, as
well as the owner of the mill, benefited from the additional employment
opportunities a new manufacturing establishment provided.' 6
Other states similarly expanded the scope of their mill acts.' 7 The consti-
tutionality of a taking under these expanded acts depended, however, on
10. Public Use, supra note 3, at 617-19. The first mills were grist mills for the grinding of
grain, which the common law viewed as public in nature because of their crucial importance to
the agrarian communities of the time. See Scheiber, supra note 7, at 371.
11. NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.2[2]. Nichols provides the clearest definition of this ap-
proach:
"[P]ublic use" means "public advantage," and that anything which tends to
enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive
power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the state (or
which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the
employment of capital and labor), manifestly contributes to the general welfare
and the prosperity of the whole community constitutes a public use.
Id. § 7.2[21, at 7-26 & n.9.
12. 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (1832).
13. Id. at 728-29.
14. Id. at 729.
15. 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467 (1832).
16. Id. at 477. In Newman, the court justified its determination of a "public use" in that
"great numbers of citizens have the means of employment brought to their homes . . . [and]
the interest or benefit arising from manufacturing establishments is distributed quite as much
S.. among the laborers . . . [as] among the proprietors of the works." Id. See also Hazen v.
Essex Co., 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 475, 477-78 (1853) ("The establishment of a great mill-power
for manufacturing purposes, as an object of great public interest, especially since manufactur-
ing has come to be one of the great public industrial pursuits of the commonwealth . . . is a
public use, justifying the exercise of the right of eminent domain").
17. See NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.623, at 7-317 & n.9; Scheiber, supra note 7, at 372-73.
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local conditions as well as on whether manufacturing already had become
dominant in the state.' 8 In Great Falls Manufacturing Co. v. Fernald," the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the right of a cotton and woolen
manufacturer to dam a river to obtain much needed water power even
though the dam would flood nearby private lands. The court said that
whether there was a "public interest" in improving the manufacturing capa-
bilities of the state depended on the character of the business promoted, the
employment opportunities created, and the state's natural productions and
resources.20 In granting the condemnation, the New Hampshire court noted
that the state's agricultural sector was unable to compete with the great
western producers and therefore depended on a nearby market which large
manufacturing concerns provided. Furthermore, the manufacturers gave
"profitable employment to great numbers of men and women."" The court
noted that the state had an ample water supply favorable to manufacturing
concerns, and had grown prosperous largely through developing such
"natural advantages.""
In Ryerson v. Brown,2" the Michigan Supreme Court, which many years
later would decide Poletown, adhered to the narrow view of public use in
invalidating a mill act. The court noted that in those states that had broadly
applied the mill acts, manufacturers had "attracted a larger proportion than
in other states, of the capital, skill, and labor of the community. In this
state it is doubtful if such legislation would add at all to the aggregate of
property." 2 The court held that nothing in the mill act in question "indi-
cate[d] that the power obtained under it [was] to be employed directly for
the public use." ' Since the court saw no "use by the public," the condem-
nation of private land was unconstitutional.
Overall, the courts expanded the use of eminent domain in the nineteenth
century to serve the needs of the newly-emerging industrial elite. The
growth of cotton mills through the early 1800's provided much of the incen-
tive for the expansion,2 6 and by 1860, production of cotton goods was the
country's leading manufacturing industry.27 Manufacturing in general also
18. This was a consideration in Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (1832),
where the court pointed to the town of Paterson as "the manufacturing emporium of the
state" and an excellent example of the benefits of industrialization. The court indicated that
the taking of private property for the construction of a mill in the town "increased the value
of property ... ; opened a market for the produce of the soil, and [has] given a stimulus to in-
dustry of every kind." Id. at 728-29. Clearly, these "public benefits" were enough to justify a
condemnation under the broad view.
19. 47 N.H. 444 (1867).
20. Id. at 460.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 461.
23. 35 Mich. 333 (1877).
24. Id. at 337.
25. Id. at 338 (emphasis added).
26. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 270.
27. This is based on the value added to the raw product by the manufacturing process. S.
[Vol. 31:115
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was growing significantly, particularly in the second half of the century. Be-
tween 1850 and 1899, the number of manufacturing establishments in the
country quadrupled, while the number of wage earners increased 550% and
the value added by manufacturing from the raw material to the finished
product increased twelvefold.2 8 Throughout this period New England was
the nation's leading manufacturing region,29 and not surprisingly, the most
hospitable to the use of eminent domain to aid the transition from an agri-
cultural to an industrial society."0
The Railroads
The need for transportation also led to the expanded use and meaning of
eminent domain. In the agricultural society of early nineteenth century
America, private parties were delegated eminent domain rights to construct
turnpikes, canals, and bridges.31 With the emergence of industry, the need
for a great transportation network to aid the development and expansion of
a vast, young country became apparent. As railroads began to cross the
country, they also were granted extensive eminent domain privileges.32 After
1860, when the first real railroad boom swept the country, the railroad in-
dustry's use of eminent domain increased dramatically.33
Responding to charges that the railroad companies were appropriating
lands for private use, the courts said that the railroads were affected with a
public interest and therefore were subject to governmental control of their
rates and obligations.3 " The public use for which the private land was taken
RATNER, J. SOLTOW & R. SYLLA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY-GROWTH,
WELFARE, AND DECISION MAKING 190 (1979).
28. E. JOHNSON & H. KROOS, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
191 (1936) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON & KROOS].
29. H. PERLOFF, E. DUNN, E. LAMPARD & R. MUTH, REGIONS, RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 120-21 (1960).
30. In Hazen v. Essex Co., 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 475 (1853), the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court upheld the right of a manufacturing company to flood its neighbor's land,
noting that "manufacturing has come to be one of the great industrial pursuits of the com-
monwealth . . . ." Id. at 478.
31. J. CADMAN, THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS, 1791-1875, at
222 (1949); Meidinger, supra note 5, at 26.
32. See Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890) (railroad deter-
mined to be a public highway and therefore it can take private property for right of way upon
payment of just compensation to owner); Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427 (1852) (legislature
used eminent domain powers to obtain property for construction of railroad by private cor-
poration). See also NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.521 (discussion of other decisions on point).
33. Meidinger, supra note 5, at 27. Railroad track mileage doubled from 1865 to 1873, and
by 1893 the railroad companies had laid six times as much track as they had by 1860, a total
of 181,000 miles of main track. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 728, 731 (Bicenn.
ed. 1975).
34. See, e.g., Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co. v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 431 (1837)
(although a railroad company is a private entity, the taking of private property for construc-
tion of the railroad is considered a public use when in the public interest); Ryan v. Terminal
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was the benefit the public acquired from the speedy transportation of per-
sons and goods, the economy of time and money to shippers and the traveling
community, and the improvement of intercity communications. Therefore,
since a railroad was organized to meet a public demand, it was immaterial
that it also was organized primarily for private profit." Courts gradually
accepted this once controversial view, although they were continually
troubled by aiding interests that were becoming further removed from
public authority.
Resources and Utilities
The last half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth
saw the expansion of mining in the West and the growth of power compan-
ies across the country. Both activities were regarded as vital for the develop-
ment of local resources, and private property therefore had to accommo-
date their growth." Western prosperity depended primarily on exploitation
of the region's inherent advantages. Mining was necessary for the "public
welfare" 8 and was "vitally connected with the recognized public policy of
developing . . . natural resources."3 9 For example, in 1867 the Nevada Sup-
reme Court noted that the state's natural conditions severely limited its eco-
nomic development. Consequently, the court adopted the broad view of
public use and allowed the condemnation of a strip of land to provide ac-
cess to the mines. Since mining was the one great pursuit of the state,
accounting for almost all of its "present prosperity," ' 0 the appropriation of
Co., 102 Tenn. 111, 124-25 (1899) ("[tlhe corporation and its property being affected by a
public use will be under governmental control, and the Legislature may at any time fix rates
and make more specific the duties clearly implied from the Act of incorporation").
35. Ryan v. Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 111, 125 (1899) ("lAin enterprise organized to meet a
public demand is not reduced in its character because the parties instituting it have primarily in
view private profit. Notwithstanding this it is still impressed with a public use.") The court
made reference to several authorities concurring With this view. See 1 J. LEWIS, THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 253 (3d ed. 1909) ("In determining whether the use
• .* is public or not, it is an immaterial consideration that the control of the property is vested
in private persons who are activated solely by motives of private gain, or that private benefits
will incidentally accrue from the condemnation.")
36. See NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.521[41, at 7-258 & n.13. ("Land cannot, however, be
taken for the use of a private railroad .... if a railroad is built solely for the use of a single
corporation and the public has no right to use it .... )
37. Meidinger, supra note 5, at 28, 32; Public Use, supra note 3, at 623.
38. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (the constitu-
tionality of Utah statute authorizing use of eminent domain powers for mining purposes,
upheld following Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905)).
39. Indianapolis Oolitic Stone Co. v. Alexander King Stone Co., 206 Ind. 412, 421, 190
N.E. 57, 60 (1934) (business of mining and quarrying is a public use because of the state's in-
terest in development of its natural resources; eminent domain can be used to bring railroads
to mines and quarries).
40. Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, I Nev. 394, 409 (1876).
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this private land was found to be a great public benefit and, thus, a legal
taking for a public use.
4
Likewise, in those states dependent on the development of the timber in-
dustry, the courts affirmed condemnations of private land for what were
actually private logging roads. Again, this was justified on the basis of the
state's natural conditions and the need for the development of its resources.
One court noted that "the individual by the development of his own prop-
erty tends to develop the entire state."
'4 2
Power and utility companies also were essential to the growth of towns
and industry, and were awarded liberal eminent domain rights. 3 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in 1908 provided the classic broad definition of em-
inent domain in allowing a company that supplied water for commercial
and manufacturing purposes to condemn land. The court, quoting an
author of a treatise on eminent domain, stated that "it is not essential that
the whole community . . . should directly enjoy or participate in an im-
provement, to make the use public. If the proposed improvement tends to
enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the pro-
ductive power of the community, the use is public."' Although some
courts still adhered to the narrow view in denying water and power com-
panies condemnation privileges,' 45 most courts allowed them to condemn,
citing the benefits to the state's progress46 and noting that any private profit
derived from the condemnation was only an "incidental object" of the ac-
quisition of the property.
4 7
41. Id. at 408. Since the discovery of the Comstock Lode in 1859, and until 1878, mining
was almost solely responsible for the growth of the Nevada economy, providing capital for
railroads, banks, and other businesses of the period. R. ELLIOTT, NEVADA'S TWENTIETH-
CENTURY MINING BOOM 3 (1966).
42. Codd v. McGoldrick Lumber Co., 48 Idaho 1, 14, 279 P. 298, 301 (1929). See also
Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 P. 426 (1906) (permitted use of eminent
domain to obtain land to be flooded in order to store logs at a saw mill because the complete
development of the state's natural resources is a "public use"); State v. Superior Court of
Clallam County, 62 Wash. 612, 114 P. 444 (1911) (operators of a tall logging road can use
eminent domain powers to obtain right of way).
43. NICHOLS, supra note 3, §§ 7.522-.523.
44. Jacobs v. Clearview Water Supply Co., 220 Pa. 388, 393-94, 69 A. 870, 872 (1908)
(quoting H. MILLS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12 (1879)).
45. See In re Eureka Basin Warehouse & Mfg. Co., 96 N.Y. 42 (1884) (eminent domain
cannot be used to take property for a private company when the public benefit is only incidental and
no public control of use exists); Fallsburg Power & Mfg. Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 43
S.E. 194 (1903) (public interest in proposed use of property was so vague that the court could
not make a determination of "public use").
46. Walker v. Shasta Power Co., 160 F. 856 (9th Cir. 1908) (taking of right of way for a
ditch and flume for purposes of providing electricity to the public is a public use and can be
accomplished through the use of eminent domain); Rockingham County Light & Power Co. v.
Hobbs, 72 N.H. 531, 58 A. 46 (1904) (eminent domain used for power line right of way).
47. Gardner Water Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Gardner, 185 Mass. 190, 194, 69 N.E.
1051, 1053 (1904) (state has right to transfer property to private water corporation to assure
the public of a constant supply of water).
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By the beginning of the twentieth century, the continent was connected
by rail and heavily industrialized. Had those who held power in 1800 been
able to predict the events of a century, they would have seen their power
being inexorably usurped by interests representing change. The nineteenth
century was a dynamic time which was more concerned with developing
property than with protecting it." As a result, emerging industrial interests
took precedence over more established elements of the economic commun-
ity. 9 Eminent domain has been called the most potent weapon in the redis-
tribution of power from the old property to the new."0
The twentieth century would seek to maintain and expand an economic
structure that now was firmly in place. Eminent domain would pave the
way for redevelopment projects involving numerous industries. The nine-
teenth century courts had provided the reasoning that would justify the ex-
pansion of the eminent domain doctrine in the twentieth century, as the
needs of society continued to change.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY-DEVELOPMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE
Twentieth century redevelopment through eminent domain first took the
form of slum clearance and urban renewal. In New York City Housing
Authority v. Muller,5' the New York Court of Appeals upheld the condem-
nation of slum property for the construction of low-income housing. The
court held that a public purpose or benefit was obtained by the slum clear-
ance itself. The elimination of disease, juvenile delinquency, and crime, as
well as the protection of the public health and welfare, were sufficient pub-
lic advantages to render the condemnation constitutional.52 Muller and its
progeny appeared to signal an early interment for the narrow doctrine of
"use by the public." 5
The demise of the narrow view seemed complete when the United States
Supreme Court, in Berman v. Parker,4 found a public purpose in a taking
48. See generally J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 24-29 (1956) ("[Oin the whole, the nineteenth century United States
valued change more than stability and valued stability most often where it helped create a
framework for change.")
49. Scheiber, supra note 7, at 331.
50. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 63.
51. 270 N.Y. 333, I N.E.2d 153 (1936).
52. Id. at 339, 1 N.E.2d at 154.
53. E.g., Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943) (eminent domain can
be used for redevelopment plan even though private company also may benefit), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 771 (1944); Nashville Hous. Auth. v. City of Nashville, 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d
946 (1951) (incidental benefit to private companies is irrelevant if public use test is met). See
Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599 (1949). At the time of the Comment, twenty-two state courts of last resort, following
the lead of Muller, had endorsed slum clearance takings as being constitutionally unobjec-
tionable. One commentator thus concluded that New York, the state which created the narrow
doctrine of public use, had taken the vanguard in its final demolition. Id. at 608.
54. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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for slum clearance, even though the property was to be resold to a private
developer." Similarly, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the right of a
municipality to sell land acquired through an urban renewal project to a
private party. 6 In so holding, the Michigan court succinctly stated the
broad view of public use taken in the slum clearance cases: "The underlying
public purpose [of the slum clearance acts] . . . is to eliminate urban blight.
The elimination of urban blight is an adequate justification for the exercise
of the power of eminent domain, even where the acquisition is followed by
sale to private individuals."'
The more controversial case, however, is the condemnation of un-
blighted property for private industrial redevelopment. Not all courts have
permitted such takings. In an early advisory opinion, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts indicated that condemnation to provide thorough-
fares and facilities for commercial use in Boston would not be constitu-
tional.58 Despite the legislature's declaration that the city's prosperity de-
pended on the existence of expanded facilities for traders, the court found
that the promotion of profit-making interests was strictly private.59 The
court feared that if it found a public use in the condemnation of residents'
homes and shops for new trading facilities, any "humble tradesman" could
be forced to surrender his property whenever the legislature thought it could
be used more profitably.6
Fifty years later, the Maine high court adhered to the narrow view in the
face of similar legislation declaring the importance of industrial develop-
55. Id. at 33-34. Only South Carolina has still refused to allow slum clearance takings
when the land is to be resold to a private developer. See Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C.
563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956) (held unconstitutional the use of eminent domain powers to obtain
title to privately owned property to transform a lower class residential area into a commercial/
industrial center).
56. Sinas v. City of Lansing, 382 Mich. 407, 170 N.W.2d 23 (1969).
57. Id. at 412, 170 N.W.2d at 26.
58. In re Opinion of the Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910). The Massachusetts
court followed Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874), where the Supreme Court held in-
valid a statute authorizing a town to issue public bonds in aid of a private manufacturing
enterprise. 204 Mass. at 611, 91 N.E. at 407. See also Mather v. City of Ottawa, 114 Il1. 659, 3
N.E. 216 (1885) ("a municipal corporation is prohibited ... from levying a tax in aid of a
merely private enterprise although the purpose may be one which will add to the wealth and
prosperity of the municipality"); Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91 (1876) ("Any [in-
dustry in a community] . . . tends indirectly to the benefit of every citizen by the increase of
general business activity, the greater facility of obtaining employment . . ., [and] the enhance-
ment in value of real estate .... But these are not the direct and immediate public uses and
purposes to which money taken by tax may be. directed."); Attorney Gen. v. City of Eau
Claire, 37 Wis. 400 (1875) (the maintenance of a dam for the purpose of leasing the water to
private persons for private use is not a public purpose for which a municipal corporation can
be authorized to exercise the power of borrowing money and levying taxes). But cf. Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896) (cities and towns permitted to aid in construc-
tion of railroad or irrigation districts of large areas of arid and worthless land since the irriga-
tion of arid lands is a public purpose and the water used is put to a public use).
59. 204 Mass. at 613, 91 N.E. at 408.
60. Id. at 613-14, 91 N.E. at 408.
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ment to Bangor's economy.6 The legislature had proposed the condemna-
tion of land within the city to create an industrial park. The court found it
"clear to all" that an existing shoe factory or paper mill in Bangor could
not acquire additional facilities by eminent domain. Likewise, the land to
be condemned for future enterprises would have no public use and would
only provide a direct benefit to private industry.62
Two additional cases also disallowed condemnations of unblighted prop-
erty for this purpose. 3 In Hogue v. Port of Seattle,6" the Washington Sup-
reme Court held unconstitutional an attempted exercise of the eminent do-
main power on prosperous agricultural land which was to be sold and used
for an industrial park. The proposed project had been undertaken largely
because of Seattle's increasing dependence on the aircraft industry. Boeing
Airplane Co. alone employed over half of the industrial employees in the
Seattle area. Thus, city officials regarded diversification essential to the eco-
nomic well-being of the city. The court, however, held that the land in
question was a fully developed agricultural area that could not be taken
merely to be put to a "higher and better economic use." 65 The court said
that "unless the state . . . can prove to a court that it seeks to acquire
property for a 'really public' use, . . . the owner may not be deprived of it
without his consent." 6 6 The dissent, in which three justices joined, would
have allowed the condemnation in light of the "economic facts and other
data unique to th[e] area." 67
61. Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904 (1957). The court found that action
under the legislation would give the city authority to do for private enterprise what they could
not do for themselves. Id. at 447, 131 A.2d at 907. See also Crommett v. City of Portland, 150
Me. 217, 236, 107 A.2d 841, 852 (1954) (condemnation for slum clearance void because it was
a taking of A's property for sale or lease to B on the ground that B's use would be
economically or socially more desirable); Haley v. Davenport, 132 Me. 148, 168 A. 102 (1933)
(an appropriation of property for a purpose which is a great benefit to the public is not for
that reason, a taking for a public use); Perkins v. Inhabitants of Milford, 59 Me. 315 (1871)
(town cannot tax in order to give an individual a gift at taxpayers' expense).
62. 152 Me. at 446, 131 A.2d at 907.
63. Indeed, one commentator believed that the interment of the narrow view was
premature in light of Hogue and Raines. See Note, The Public Use Doctrine: "Advance Re-
quiem" Revisited, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 688, 697-701.
64. 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
65. Id. at 827, 341 P.2d at 187. The court further noted that it was their duty to uphold
the rights of "private property owners against the inroads of public bodies who seek to acquire
it for private purposes which they honestly believe is essential for the public good." Id. at 838,
341 P.2d at 193. But see Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963)
(state can condemn land located within a blighted area for urban renewal, even though the
specific land was not substandard or offensive itself, since the clearance of the blighted condi-
tions of the area as a whole is for a public purpose).
66. 54 Wash. 2d at 838-39, 341 P.2d at 193.
67. Id. at 843, 341 P.2d at 196 (Finley, J., dissenting). The dissent was based on Ghold
Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954), where the Connecticut
court, using the broad view of public use, held that public use means "public usefulness, utility,
or advantage or what is productive of general benefit ...... Id. at 141, 104 A.2d at 368.
Therefore, the dissent in Hogue argued that the overall benefit to be gained by improved
[Vol. 31:115
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Similarly, in City of. Little Rock v. Raines,6 the Arkansas Supreme Court
denied the city the right to condemn agricultural land for development of
an industrial park. The court found that unlike slum clearance, the major
purpose of which was the elimination of unsafe and unsanitary conditions,
in this case the sole purpose of the industrial park was to sell or lease the
land to private parties.6 9 The court held, therefore, that in light of constitu-
tional provisions prohibiting such a taking, if the people of Arkansas
wished to confer on their cities the power to acquire private property by
eminent domain for private industrial development, they should do so in
clear statutory language. °
Other courts proved more hospitable to commercial interests. In Atwood
v. Willacy County Navigation District," the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
allowed a condemnation of 1,760 acres of undeveloped land bordering on
the Gulf of Mexico for the construction of a port and attendant facilities to
be used in connection with the development and operation of the state's
navigable waters. The court held that leasing portions of the land for indus-
trial sites was necessary for the success of the port and thus was a legitimate
public purpose of the Navigation District.' 2 The court noted that because of
its vast oil and gas reserves, the Texas Gulf Coast was "one of the rapidly
developing industrial sections of the United States. . . [and that] industrial
development and the successful operation of ports located upon either the
gulf or the canal go hand in hand."' 3
navigation, development of port facilities, and the influx of people and population growth in
the Seattle area justified the taking as a "public use." 54 Wash. 2d at 843, 341 P.2d at 196
(Finley, J., dissenting).
68. 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967).
69. Id. at 1086, 411 S.W. 2d at 494. The Raines court noted that in the case of slum
clearance, once the public purpose is accomplished, the city's subsequent selling of a portion of
the slum clearance property to a private enterprise does not make the use any less public or un-
constitutional. Id.
70. Id.
71. 271 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
72. Id. at 142.
73. Id. The basis for the court's rationale was laid down in Housing Auth. of Dallas v.
Higgenbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79 (1940), in which the court held that courts should
not intervene when the particular undertaking of the legislature was intended to include slum
clearance and to provide safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations for persons of low in-
come. Such an undertaking was found to be a public use. This doctrine of substantial com-
pliance is applied to cases involving public improvements and special assessments. Shortly after
Atwood, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Port of Umatilla v. Richmond, 212 Or. 596, 321 P.2d
338 (1958), upheld a condemnation for the development of a port and potential leasing of sites
to private industry. The Oregon court heard the case on the assumption that the Port intended
to lease sites to private parties at a future date even though no such purpose was set out in the
resolution. Relying on its own slum clearance decision in Foeller v. Housing Auth. of
Portland, 198 Or. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953), the court found that the Port's subsequent leasing
would merely be an incidental part of the project and would not destroy its public character.
212 Or. at 614, 321 P.2d at 347. Past Oregon eminent domain cases, however, including
Foeller, had been decided on the narrow ground of the public's actual right to use the property,
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Likewise, in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Author-
ity,7" the New York Court of Appeals permitted condemnation of a flour-
ishing small business area for the construction of the World Trade Center.
New York's economy had begun to decline as the city aged. Noting the
"cause and effect relationship between a great port and a great city," the
court found a public purpose in facilitating the flow of commerce and cen-
tralizing all activity incident to that flow, thus attracting trade and stimula-
ting the economic well-being of the city.75
Although some courts attempted to resurrect the narrow view of public
use,"6 two more recent cases may have finally re-entombed it. In a 1975 de-
cision, Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc.," the
Maryland Court of Appeals allowed condemnation of approximately 323
acres of vacant land for the development of a multi-industry "employment
center" or industrial park that was expected to attract new industries to the
county and provide up to 5,800 new jobs for county residents. The county's
condemnation petition cited the need to diversify its taxable base and estab-
lish "a healthy economic mix of gainful pursuits" so as not to depend too
much on one segment of the economy.7 ' In allowing the taking, the court
emphasized that the park would attract industries which in the past had
been difficult to attract. Furthermore, the county would maintain control of
the park's development even after the sale of the land to private parties.
The court concluded that the creation of the park was a constitutionally
permissible public use."
Similarly, in 1980, in City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele,8° the Minnesota
Supreme Court allowed a taking for construction of a retail-hotel-office
space complex under a statute permitting cities to condemn areas which,
though not blighted, showed a trend toward decreasing economic utility and
and the court was reluctant to stray too far from precedent. Port of Umatilla illuminates
courts' dilemma in adapting eminent domain law to modern conditions while trying to adhere
to long-held doctrine.
74. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78,
rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 960 (1963). See also Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210,
182 N.E.2d 395, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 4 (1962) (taking of substandard
real estate which was 75% vacant, poorly developed, and incompatible with economic growth
by a municipality for redevelopment by private corporations, was a species of public use; con-
demnation permitted). Accord, Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1965) (private pro-
perty condemned for the development and improvement of harbors and ports is a public use,
even though there is no indiscriminate public use or that certain ports are leased for separate
private use by persons or corporations in continuous need of harbor or port conveniences).
75. 12 N.Y.2d at 388-89, 190 N.E.2d at 404-05, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 5-6.
76. See notes 58-70 and accompanying text supra.
77. 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975).
78. Id. at 176, 339 A.2d at 281.
79. Id. at 179, 339 A.2d at 282-84. The court held that projects reasonably designed to
benefit the general public by significantly enhancing the economic growth of the state or its
subdivisions are public uses. Id. at 191, 339 A.2d at 289.
80. 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980).
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tax base." The condemned land in downtown Minneapolis was stagnant
and unproductive, and its revitalization was considered essential to maintain
the downtown area as a viable business district. The complex was expected
to provide 5,900 permanent jobs 2 and to attract conventioneers and new
residents, thus generating significant retail sales and property taxes. The
court, therefore, held that a general public benefit existed to justify the tak-
ing as a public use.'"
Thus, by the second half of the twentieth century, takings on behalf of
private parties had expanded far beyond what the originators of the broad
"public benefit" standard must have envisaged. Condemnation for sites for
private industrial complexes, though not universally approved, was gradu-
ally gaining acceptance. But the country also had been transformed. At the
start of the nineteenth century, the concentration of production in agricul-
ture, handicrafts, and small businesses made it possible for most people to
be self-employed.' By 1975, however, only seven percent of the nonfarm
81. Id. at 390. Justice Fitzgerald, dissenting in Poletown, cited Wurtele as a case which has
sustained the use of eminent domain power solely because of the economic benefits of develop-
ment. Fitzgerald noted that the Michigan court had not followed this reasoning and cited two
recent cases, Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978) and
City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979), which also have rejected the use
of eminent domain when the sole purpose of the condemnation is to improve general economic
conditions. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 643-44, 304
N.W.2d 455, 464 (1981) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). It should be noted that both South
Carolina and Kentucky adhere strictly to the narrow view of the public use doctrine. South
Carolina has not allowed condemnation for slum clearance. See note 55 supra. The Kentucky
court pointed out that condemnation of blighted areas, which is of a general public benefit and
is therefore a public use,_is the sole exception to its narrow "use by the public" doctrine. 581
S.W.2d at 7.
82. In 1975, a federal district court cited growth in employment as a factor in allowing
condemnation for the Tellico Dam, even though private profit was an incidental benefit of the
project. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Two Tracts of Land, 387 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Tenn. 1974),
aff'd, 532 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976). Likewise, issuance of in-
dustrial development bonds to attract industry to reduce unemployment consistently has been
held to be for a public purpose. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Palmer, 468 P.2d 326 (Alaska
1970) (issuance of bonds to finance a twenty year improvement program fulfills public purpose
requirement of the constitution, since the bonds would develop industry and create jobs in an
eroding economic community); Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956)
(municipal bonds issued to reduce abnormal unemployment and attract new industry into the
area held to be a sufficient public use). In disallowing the issuance of bonds to acquire sites
and construct buildings for lease to private industry, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in
Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968),
nevertheless noted that at least 42 states had held the issuance of bonds to cure unemployment
to be for a public purpose. Id. at 147, 159 S.E.2d at 752. Those courts which permit industrial
development bonds, but deny eminent domain rights in the same situation, note that the op-
portunity for abuse is far greater in the latter case, where the burden is placed on the few in-
stead of the whole community. See City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky.
1979).
83. 291 N.W.2d at 390-91.
84. U.S. DEP'Ts OF LABOR AND OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, EMPLOYMENT AND
TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 149 (1976). In 1900, 27% of nonfarm laborers were self-
employed. Id. at 147-49.
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work force was self-employed." The United States, once a land of farmers
and small entrepreneurs, had become a nation of employees.
Moreover, the courts no longer were faced with a developing country, but
with deteriorating cities and high unemployment. In 1909, the author of the
leading treatise on eminent domain had first expressed the view that was re-
peated in every later edition of the work: land could not be taken for the
erection of a large factory, no matter how beneficial to the community,
since "the public mind would instinctively revolt at any attempt to take
such land by eminent domain."" Since then land had been taken for essen-
tially this purpose, and in a much changed country, the Michigan Supreme
Court would be the first to formally renounce those words. And none
would revolt but the dispossessed. 7
POLETOWN NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL v. CITY OF DETROIT
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit," the Michigan
Supreme Court, in a cursory per curiam opinion, rejected the argument of
the neighborhood residents' association that a condemnation for a GM fac-
tory was an unconstitutional transfer of property from one private party to
another. The condemnation was based on the Economic Development Cor-
porations Act, which the Michigan legislature passed in 1974.9 The Act was
designed to encourage expansion of commercial enterprises and revitalize
Michigan's weakened economy.9 The plaintiff residents did not challenge
the legislature's declaration that the alleviation of unemployment and the
development of industry were essential public purposes, but argued only
85. Id.
86. NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.61[l]. The author cites for his position Howard Mills Co.
v. Schwartz Lumber & Coal Co., 77 Kan. 599, 95 P. 559 (1908), "the only case in which it has
been attempted to take land for the site of a factory without the consent of the owner."
NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.61[l]. The court in Howard Mills Co. asserted that "every
legitimate business" contributes to the growth and development of its locality. To invoke emi-
nent domain, however, a business must be one in which the public has "an exceptional and
peculiar interest and one which . . . [the public] might on proper occasion control and manage
..... " 77 Kan. at 609, 95 P. at 562-63. The land sought to be condemned was being used in a
lumber and coal business, and the condemnor may not have put it to a better use; therefore,
the court refused to allow the eminent domain power to be employed. Id.
87. Justice Ryan cited the "chorus of approval" in favor of the condemnation supplied by
business and governmental interests as well as the news media. The only dissenting voices were
those of the "miniscule minority"-the Poletown residents. Poletown Neighborhood Council
v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 684, 304 N.W.2d 455, 482 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
88. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
89. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.1601 (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 5.3520 (1) (Callaghan 1976)).
90. The Act granted cities the right to condemn property for industrial and commercial
sites. In passing the Act, the legislature cited the state's "need for programs to alleviate and
prevent conditions of unemployment . . . to assist and retain local industries and commercial
enterprises, to strengthen and revitalize the economy of this state and its municipalities ...
and . . . to encourage the location and expansion of commercial enterprises ... " Id.
§ 125.1602 (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 5.3520 (2) (Callaghan 1976)).
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that in this instance, General Motors, a private corporation, was the pri-
mary beneficiary of the taking.
The court said that it must inspect such a charge with "heightened scru-
tiny" where, as here, the condemnation benefited specific and identifiable
private interests. 9 ' It nevertheless dismissed the plaintiff's claim that assem-
bling land to GM's specifications for conveyance to GM for uncontrolled
use in profit-making activities was a taking for private use., 2 The court held
that any benefit to GM's private interest was merely "incidental" to the
public purposes for which the land was to be utilized, and therefore the
transfer of property to GM was not unconstitutional.9 ' The court cited the
''substantial evidence of the severe economic conditions" in the city and
made it clear that it would not uphold every condemnation that provided
employment. In this instance, however, the public benefit was found to be
"clear and significant."'"
The two dissenting justices argued that the majority had gone too far.
Justice Fitzgerald contended that there was no Michigan precedent for the
decision. Distinguishing Poletown from the slum clearance cases, he reason-
ed that in the former case no public purpose would be served without the
transfer of property to GM, while in the latter cases the clearance itself was
the controlling public purpose. Thus, the transfer could not be considered
incidental, and if allowed, there would be "virtually no limit to the use of
condemnation to aid private businesses. '
Justice Ryan's dissent argued that Detroit, a city with its "economic back
to the wall," had been coerced by GM's threat to build its plant elsewhere
if a suitable local site could not be found quickly. Ryan noted that histori-
cally, only private corporations involved in the "establishment or improve-
ment of the avenues of commerce" had been allowed to condemn.9" An ex-
ception to the general rule that eminent domain could not be used to trans-
fer property to private corporations was created for railroad, canal, turn-
pike, ferry, and other private transportation companies. To justify condem-
nation on behalf of a private party, three conditions had to be met: extreme
necessity on behalf of the condemnor, continuing accountability to the pub-
lic, and selection of land according to facts of public significance.98 Ryan
argued that none of these factors was present in Poletown. GM could sur-
vive without the condemnation, the city was to retain no control over the
91. 410 Mich. at 634-35, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60.
92. Id. at 631-32, 304 N.W.2d at 458.
93. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 644, 304.N.W.2d at 464 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 651, 304 N.W.2d at 467-68 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 670-71, 304 N.W.2d at 476 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Ryan stated that the general
rule is that a taking for a private corporation is prohibited unless the corporation's purpose is
to create or expand on the transportation system and thereby benefit commerce. Justice Ryan
referred to this as the "instrumentality of commerce" exception.
98. Id. at 674-75, 304 N.W.2d at 478-80.
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operation of the plant, and the selection of the land was made according to
GM's private specifications.
That Poletown was a break with precedent the majority could not and
did not deny. The majority cited no authority for its decision, instead noted
that the definition of a public use "changes with changing conditions of
society."" An examination of the Michigan Supreme Court's past decisions
leads one to conclude that the court formerly would have prohibited the
taking.' 0 The court had refused to allow condemnation in the mill act
cases'0 ' and later had upheld the use of eminent domain for slum clearance
only after finding that resale to private developers, though contemplated,
was not the actual purpose of the acquisition.' 2 In approving this use of
eminent domain in In re Slum Clearance in Detroit,' °3 the court distin-
guished Berrien Springs Water-Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge,' 4 an
earlier decision in which condemnation for the dual purpose of improving
the navigability of the St. Joseph River, a public purpose, and providing
water power for a corporation, a private purpose, was barred.' °5 In Berrien
Springs Water-Power Co., the court found that the condemnation itself
achieved no public purpose and the resale to and development by the power
company woufd result in only concurrent public and private benefits. In In
re Slum Clearance in Detroit,' 6 however, slum clearance in and of itself
99. Id. at 630, 304 N.W.2d at 457 (quoting Hayes v. Kalamazoo, 316 Mich. 443, 453-54,
25 N.W.2d 787, 790-91 (1947)).
100. See Shizas v. City of Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589 (1952) (land cannot be con-
demned if its use is for both off-street parking facilities and rentals to private businesses);
Board of Health v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533, 49 N.W. 894 (1891) (statute void which allowed
corporations to condemn land to establish and maintain rural cemeteries).
101. E.g., Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877) (land cannot be condemned for the pur-
pose of aiding manufacturers to harness water power for their mills).
102. See In re Slum Clearance in Detroit, 331 Mich. 714, 50 N.W.2d 340 (1951) (slum
clearance not unconstitutional although after the buildings were razed the site was to be sold to
private persons for redevelopment). For the proposition that the public purpose will not be
defeated because an incidental private benefit from a portion of the property will result, see
Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 322 Mich. 172, 33 N.W.2d 747 (1948) (city's condemnation of
private property for use as bus terminal not defeated because of incidental private benefits that
would result); General Dev. Corp. v. City of Detroit, 322 Mich. 495, 33 N.W.2d 919 (1948)
(city's temporary leasing of condemned land to tenants did not defeat the public purpose
because of the recent war conditions); In re Brewster St. Hous. Site, 291 Mich. 313, 289 N.W.
493 (1939) (the incidental and necessary effect of creating a housing commission did not under-
mine the state's main objective in providing decent housing).
103. 331 Mich. 714, 50 N.W.2d 340 (1951).
104. 133 Mich. 48, 94 N.W. 379 (1903).
105. Id. at 52-53, 94 N.W. at 380-81. In Berrien Springs, the court found that the legislature
had determined that it was a "public necessity" to require the improvement of navigability of
the river. The legislature went beyond its power in doing so because it thereby also declared the
incidental benefit of water power to a private entity a public necessity. In essence the
legislature had provided for a taking of private land under the guise of eminent domain when
the public and private purposes of the taking could not be separated. The court held that the
act allowing this dual purpose was unconstitutional. Id. at 54-55, 94 N.W. at 381.
106. 331 Mich. 714, 720, 50 N.W.2d 340, 343 (1951). The court noted that the jury was asked
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was found to have a substantial public purpose and any incidental or ancil-
lary private benefit from resale of the land to private parties would not
preclude use of eminent domain powers.
In Shizas v. City of Detroit, ' decided in 1953, the court again barred
condemnation when its public purpose was inseparable from its private
benefits. In Shizas, the court disallowed a proposed taking for the construc-
tion of a municipal parking garage and retail complex to house twenty-two
stores which the city planned to lease to private parties.' 8 Although the
leased area comprised less than twenty-five percent of the total floor space
in the structure, the private use was not classified as incidental. Rather, the
two purposes were "so interwoven that they [could] not be separated."'' 9
The intended allocation of rental revenues to the parking facility did not
alter the complex's private character.
In 1972, the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that slum
clearance is a public use if the controlling purpose of such clearance is reha-
bilitation of blighted areas. In City of Center Line v. Michigan Bell Tel.
Co.," the court found that the property in question was acquired not "for
the purpose of redevelopment at a profit to the city or any private de-
veloper, but to protect the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the
municipality."'. Although the cleared land was to be resold to a private
developer, this was only an incidental and ancillary benefit to the primary
and real purpose of the clearance." 2 Since there was no dual purpose in-
volved, the court upheld the Rehabilitation of Blighted Areas Act, under
which the condemnation was granted." 3
In Poletown, the twin purposes of the condemnation for GM-which it-
self had recently suffered heavy losses and which was immediately conveyed
a factory site that it needed to remain competitive-cannot be easily
severed. If GM's plant is not profitable, the employment it is to create will
be lost, the prosperity it is to bring will vanish. Instead of having a slum
cleared away, the city will lose a viable residential area. Thus, it cannot be
argued that the benefit to GM is merely incidental to a larger public
benefit. Detroit's welfare is inextricably linked to GM's, and the public and
private interests served can hardly be entwined more tightly.
Despite the Poletown court's failure to follow its own precedent, it cor-
rectly held that the definition of "public purpose" could not be static.
to decide the necessity of the taking only for the clearly public purpose of slum clearance, and
not for resale of the property. Id.
107. 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589 (1952).
108. Id. at 60, 52 N.W.2d at 596. The court stated: " 'A statute authorizing a taking of
private property for uses partly public and partly private is void, where the private use is so
combined with the public use that the two cannot be separated.' " Id. at 59, 52 N.W.2d at 596
(quoting 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 31 at 268).
109. 333 Mich. at 60, 52 N.W.2d at 596.
110. 387 Mich. 260, 196 N.W.2d 144 (1972).
111. Id. at 265, 196 N.W.2d at 146.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 266, 196 N.W.2d at 147.
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Many courts have not hesitated to expand the use of eminent domain and
allow takings of private property to serve some perceived public good even
when private interests were clearly benefited. The origins of such takings
can be traced at least as far back as the early nineteenth century decisions
extending the provisions of the mill acts to manufacturing firms."' Their
progeny can be followed to the beginnings of the twentieth century in the
cases permitting condemnations for mining, logging, and utility companies." II
Large scale takings for economic development, however, began only in
the mid-twentieth century with the port district cases.'' 6 Such projects, in-
volving the development of a public port and an industrial park as a necess-
ary attendant, easily could be viewed as primarily public in nature. When
these cases arose in the 1950's, the country was still in its post-World War
II era of prosperity and growth, and the condemnations provided stimuli
for areas of growing industrial strength. The impetus for the actions was
much the same as that for much earlier takings."'
As the economy faltered, the courts were faced with a dilemma: permit
what appeared to be a private use of eminent domain power and perhaps
abandon the long-held public use doctrine altogether, or possibly allow de-
caying or underdeveloped areas to deteriorate totally. Neither alternative
was acceptable. Instead, the courts allowed private development to proceed
under the facade of public use and "incidental" private benefit.
Poletown is an extreme example of private development cloaked in the
public use doctrine. Detroit was the most severely depressed of the nation's
cities. It was, therefore, as the dissent argued, highly susceptible to GM's
entreaties as well as its threats to leave. But Poletown does not fit easily
within the framework of past cases. Previous decisions had used eminent
domain to attract new and varied industry into an area, while Poletown was
razed to allow an existing industry to remain. For example, in Prince
George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc.," 8 the court noted that
there was "no suggestion" that the condemnation's purpose was "to benefit
any particular private businesses." "9 In Poletown, however, the "inciden-
tal" benefit would be concentrated entirely in one corporation.
Regardless of recent decisions in other states, Poletown's extremity starkly il-
lustrates the evolution of eminent domain and its possible future. Histori-
114. See notes 9-22 and accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 37-47 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra. Slum clearance cases should be classified
differently from the later community development decisions. Slum clearance takings were in-
tended primarily for the removal of blighted areas in cities, not for economic development. It
was a particular section that needed the redevelopment, not the region as a whole.
117. See notes 74-83 and accompanying text supra.
118. 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975).
119. Id. at 190, 339 A.2d at 288. The court in Prince George's County further noted that
the county would maintain significant control over the land after it was sold to private
developers. Id. at 180, 339 A.2d at 283.
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cally, private industry was granted eminent domain privileges to develop an
emerging nation which might otherwise have faltered. The original grist
mills were essential to the community's existence until industrialism brought
prosperity and growth. Railroads spread this prosperity, providing Eastern
manufacturers and Western miners and loggers with distant markets. The
courts utilized the ever-widening doctrines of eminent domain and public
use to encourage prosperity and to develop a state's natural advantages.' , °
With increased prosperity, eminent domain served in the nineteenth cen-
tury to transfer property and power from the old elite to the new. In
Poletown, eminent domain served to maintain power in an elite that was
already well-established and seemingly impregnable. It served this purpose
in previous redevelopment cases, notably Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v.
Port of New York Authority, where the construction of the World Trade
Center was intended to attract large international firms.'"' But in Poletown
the beneficiary was the third largest industrial corporation in the nation-a
solely private enterprise that was firmly entrenched in Detroit. Ironically,
the city now sought to restore the prosperity lost because of its dependence
on that very corporation. The condemnation of Poletown introduced an ele-
ment foreign to the law of eminent domain and never addressed by the
court: the concept of responsibility for the economic decline of the city.
Thus, an evaluation of Poletown requires an examination of two factors:
the relationship between Detroit's economy and GM, and GM's own decline
and need for a new factory.
GENERAL MOTORS AND DETROIT'S ECONOMY
The major benefit of the proposed GM factory in Detroit was to be the
creation of 6,150 new jobs.'22 This prospect was the most significant factor
in the court's decision, as Michigan's unemployment rate stood at 14.20o
and Detroit's unemployment rate at eighteen percent.' 23 Indeed, the
economic conditions of Detroit at the time of the Poletown decision were
bleak. In 1979, new motor vehicle sales declined substantially from the
record 1978 figure of 15.3 million.' 2' At the end of the third quarter of
1979, more than 85,000 auto workers across the nation were on indefinite
120. The courts have concentrated on the states' then current prosperity and the states' fur-
ther need to develop their material resources. See Codd v. McGoldrick Lumber Co., 48 Idaho
1, 279 P. 298 (1929) (timber); Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876)
(mining); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444 (1876) (water power); Atwood v.
Willacy Co. Navigation Dist., 271 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (oil).
121. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
122. 410 Mich. at 650, 304 N.W.2d at 467 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (quoting CITY OF
DETROIT COMMUNITY & ECONOMIC DEV. DEP'T DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL PARK, THE CITIES OF DETROIT AND HAMTRAMCK, MICHIGAN 11-4 to I1-5
(Oct. 15, 1980)).
123. 410 Mich. at 647, 304 N.W.2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Both of these unemploy-
ment rates were far greater than the national average.
124. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 23 (Oct. 1979).
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layoff,' 2 and by July, 1981 that figure had risen to 153,000. These layoffs
included 67,000 GM workers, reflecting a steady increase in layoffs since
January.' 26 Forty thousand autoworkers had been laid off in Detroit alone
since 1979. Less than one month before Poletown was decided, General
Motors announced that it was planning to cut its worldwide salaried staff
by ten percent. If cuts were made proportionately by region, this would
mean 5,000 jobs lost in the Detroit area.' 7
Justice Ryan, dissenting in Poletown, noted that the cause of the
economic crisis was Detroit's dependence on "the now foundering
automobile industry."' Detroit's dependence was greatest on GM, which
in 1980 employed fifty-eight percent of American automobile workers.'
Justice Ryan's observations were not unique. The Detroit area's heavy
dependence on the automobile industry had in the past continually led to
alternating periods of economic boom and malaise. The motor vehicle in-
dustry has always been among the most cyclically sensitive industries,' 30 and
periods of both prosperity and recession are accentuated in areas
economically dependent on it.'
A study of Michigan's economic performance from the late 1960's to the
late 1970's emphasized its "long history as a cyclically sensitive state" with
a repeated "boom and bust cycle.""'3 The study concluded that the state's
concentration in durable goods manufacturing, particularly in the motor
vehicle industry, was the major factor in this pattern.' 33 In Detroit,
manufacturing accounted for 33.70o of total employment in 1977, and the
transportation equipment industry, which includes the automobile and
related industries, accounted for 41.90 of manufacturing employment.' 3
Thus, Detroit's cycles mirrored those of the state. In the 1973-1975 reces-
sion, manufacturing employment in the city dropped 20.1%, resulting in the
loss of 125,000 jobs.' 35 Michigan's average 1974 unemployment rate of
125. Id.
126. Sacramento Union, July 24, 1981, at B8, col. 6.
127. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1981, at 31, col. 4.
128. 410 Mich. at 647, 304 N;W.2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
129. Worthy, The 500: The Fortune Directory of the Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations,
FORTUNE, May 4, 1981, at 324-25, 330-31.
130. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 18 (May 1980).
131. In the 1920's, Michigan was even more prosperous than the rest of the country, while
in the 1930's the depression there was particularly severe. During and immediately after World
War II, Michigan was again prosperous as the car companies first produced war armaments
and then supplied the heavy post-war consumer demand for autos. MICHIGAN ENERGY SURVEY
COMMITTEE, ENERGY AND THE MICHIGAN ECONOMY, A FORECAST 44-45 (1967). Auto sales
declined by 25% in 1956, which resulted in Michigan unemployment reaching 7% in that year
and 14% during the recession of 1958. Through the early and mid-1960's Michigan was again
exceptionally prosperous as the economy and automobile production both surged. Id. at 46.
132. P. KOZLOWSKI, BUSINESS CONDITIONS IN MICHIGAN METROPOLITAN AREAS 1 (1979).
133. Id. at 7-8.
134. Id. at 78-79.
135. By contrast, nonmanufacturing employment fell 3.6% during the same period. Id. at
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8.5% was the highest of 27 large states the Department of Labor studied.' 36
When Detroit's unemployment rate hit eighteen percent in February, 1975,
however, a news report noted that the city had actually suffered from
unemployment averaging around nine percent since the late 1960's, when
local businesses began to leave and "the carmakers stepped up automation
of their facilities."' Moreover, while historically the motor vehicle in-
dustry has employed a steady ratio of production workers to salaried of-
ficials, this proportion fell noticeably during the recession years of the
1950's, 1960's, and 1970's, since "production workers are more directly af-
fected by the demand for automobiles."' 38 Those whom the proposed fac-
tory is to employ are always the first to see their jobs disappear. '39
Thus, Detroit's and Michigan's exceptional prosperity as well as crises are
attributable primarily to the auto industry and few would wish to see the in-
dustry disappear. But in Poletown the industry was pitted against individual
property rights which also are not easily sacrificed. The concern in this case
was not the undisputed contribution of GM to the city's former prosperity,
but the relief of current high unemployment. The court's action must be
evaluated in those specific terms, and in such terms one must weigh the
sacrifice of a "unique" ethnic neighborhood' 0 against GM's role in the
economic crisis.
Without other options, the city attempted to reverse its economic decline
by increasing its dependency on the cause of that decline. The city and the
court turned for help to an entity, and an industry, whose very nature made
the solution uncertain. History has shown that employment in the auto in-
81. Furthermore, nationwide employment in the motor vehicle and equipment industry fell by
12.207o, or 114,000 workers, between November 1973 and March 1974. ECONOMIC REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT 59 (1975).
136. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GEOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF EMPLOY-
MENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, 1974, at 2 (1976). Detroit's average unemployment of nine percent
in 1974 was the highest among the 30 large labor areas profiled. Id. at 3.
137. Detroit's Gamble to Get Rolling Again, TIME, Feb. 10, 1975, at 73.
138. U.S. DEP'TS OF LABOR AND OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, EMPLOYMENT AND
TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 93 (1977).
139. Two courts had previously considered the public use exception in connection with an
area's dependence on one employer. In Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d
171 (1959), which arose in a time of prosperity, the court rejected a taking without addressing
the evidence of the aircraft industry's dominance in the city. Id. at 839, 341 P.2d at 194. When
Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975),
was decided, the county was beginning to feel the effects of its dependence on the federal
government, and the court permitted the condemnation of the land to construct a new in-
dustrial park. Id. at 190-91, 339 A.2d at 288-89. The court permitted condemnations because
such takings were designed to lessen dependence on a single employer-the opposite scenario
from the Poletown case.
140. 410 Mich. 616, 683, 304 N.W.2d 455, 481 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting). More import-
antly than financial loss, the condemnation could result in "intangible losses, such as severance
or [sic] personal attachments to one's domicile and neighborhood and the destruction of an
organic community of a most unique and irreplaceable character." Id. at 682-83, 304 N.W.2d
at 481 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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dustry is unlikely to remain stable. The proposed plant was itself intended
to replace two factories GM was planning to close in 1983. Thus, the jobs
created would simply replace those which would otherwise be lost, and
would not make up for the total loss of employment in the city. General
Motors in fact guaranteed only 3,000 of the promised 6,150 jobs, while the
project displaced nearly 3,500 residents. Moreover, even this guarantee of
3,000 jobs is suspect. On November 3, 1981, GM, still in the shadow of a
vanished neighborhood, announced a one-year delay in the construction of
the factory. It denied charges that all plans for the new plant had been
dropped.""
Only Justice Ryan's dissent recognized the inherent instability of the
result in Poletown. He noted GM's lack of guarantees regarding employ-
ment at the proposed plant and speculated as to what the automotive in-
dustry's condition would be in ten or twenty years." 2 Automation had
already been credited with perpetuating a high unemployment rate in
Detroit. Furthermore, General Motors plans to install 5,000 robots in its
assembly plants by 1985 and 14,000 by 1990, thereby replacing many pro-
duction workers.'4 3 It seems Detroit has pursued an unlikely saviour.
GENERAL MOTORS' NEED FOR A NEW FACTORY
According to the Environmental Impact Statement the city prepared, GM
needed a "new generation" manufacturing facility for production of its
new models because it would be too costly and time consuming to retool its
existing assembly plants."' The existing plants were unsuitable in two major
respects: first, for manufacturing automobiles meeting future hydrocarbon
emission control standards, and second, for production of "a more com-
petitive product line that meets energy efficiency criteria"-in essence,
smaller cars.""4
Hydrocarbon Emission Control Standards
Although GM would have to modify existing facilities to meet stationary
emission control standards, the immediate problem facing it was vehicle
compliance with movable hydrocarbon emission requirements. The failure
to meet these standards is traceable to GM's own actions. In January 1969,
the federal government charged the four major American automobile com-
141. Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1981, at D8, col. 1.
142. Justice Ryan surmised, "[for all that can be known now, in light of present trends, the
plant could be fully automated in 10 years." 410 Mich. at 679, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
143. Shinoff, A Hard Look: Are Workers Victims of industry's Productivity Push?, S.F.
Examiner, May 22, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (morning ed.).
144. 410 Mich. 616, 648-49, 304 N.W.2d 455, 466 (1981), (quoting CITY OF DETROIT COM-
MUNITY & ECONOMIC DEV. DEP'T DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: CENTRAL IN-
DUSTRIAL PARK, THE CITIES OF DETROIT AND HAMTRAMCK, MICHIGAN 11-4 (Oct. 15, 1980)).
145. Id.
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panies-GM, Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors-and others with hav-
ing conspired since 1953 to delay the development of devices to control
automobile air pollution.'"6 The government alleged, among other charges,
that the defendants had agreed with one another not to compete in develop-
ing and marketing pollution control devices and not to market a car with
such devices until an agreed-upon date. On October 28, 1969, the carmakers
entered into a consent decree with the government settling the suit. Without
conceding that a conspiracy had existed, they agreed not to conspire in the
future to delay installation of pollution control equipment, nor to engage in
other anti-competitive practices.""
A Justice Department memorandum regarding the case was presented to
a congressional hearing on large corporations.' 8 The memo charged that
the "big four" automakers, since they had the most to lose financially,
were most active in the anti-competition scheme.' 9 The memorandum
quoted an internal GM document that expressed reluctance to undertake the
production of devices that would not contribute to the saleable aspects of
automobiles, even though "they appear to be based on sound
principles."'"' The memorandum claimed that reliance on the anti-
competitive cooperation had enabled the automobile manufacturers to
disregard other approaches to the problem of emissions, thereby further
delaying a solution.' 5 '
The alleged conspiracy, which apparently ended in 1969, may have little
to do with GM's ability to meet emission control standards after 1980.
Nevertheless, ignoring the problem of pollution for fifteen years or more
arguably could seriously impede later progress in controlling it. At the very
least, it raises issues of GM's good faith, its own exacerbation of the need
for a new factory, and the implicit fairness of taking property to meet that
need.
Fuel-Efficient Cars
Similarly, GM's deliberate decision to delay building smaller, more fuel
efficient cars also exacerbated its problems when consumers turned to the
smaller models. GM initially announced plans to build lightweight cars im-
mediately after World War II, but abandoned them in 1946. Lawrence
146. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1969, at 28, col. 1. The practices alleged in the Justice Depart-
ment's original complaint included any concerted action to delay installation of fume control
equipment, to restrict individual company publicity on technical advances, to require joint ap-
praisal of equipment patents and to acquire patents on a pool basis, or to respond only jointly
to governmental requests for information or proposals.
147. Id.
148. Role of Giant Corporations, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the
Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
149. Id. at 1663.
150. Id. at 1664.
151. Id. at 1685. One such approach the industry ignored was a carburetor that would have
reduced pollutants at a manufacturer's cost of six dollars per unit. Id. at 1686.
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White, in his study of the automobile industry after the war, concluded that
the car companies were deliberately slow in entering the small car market
because such cars were less profitable than larger models. The companies
also were reluctant to enter the market until they were sure they could all
compete effectively.' 2 Throughout the 1950's, American cars continually
grew larger and heavier, while in the middle of the decade the smaller im-
ports began to sell well. The major American automakers disparaged the
phenomenon as temporary, but finally introduced their own compact cars
in 1959.'" Import sales appeared to have reached their peak in the early
1960's, but then began to rise again in 1963. Again, the American com-
panies disparaged the trend until 1968'11 when GM, Ford, and American
Motors again announced plans for new, smaller cars.'II
The market share of domestic compact cars increased slightly in 1967
after a decline from 1963-1966.56 But imports, almost all of them com-
pacts, doubled their market share between 1963 and 1968,'" when import
sales increased by thirty percent over 1967.158 Thus, the overall market
share of smaller cars-imports and domestic compacts-had remained
steady for the preceding three years.' In the first quarter of 1970, sales of
most domestic cars dropped drastically while those of fuel-efficient imports
and compacts continued to rise, evincing the "growing demand for small
cars.," 
6
Despite the trend toward smaller cars and the fact that transportation was
the largest consumer of oil in a country that consumed one-third of the
world's energy,' 6' the automakers continued to produce heavier, less fuel-
efficient cars.' 2 At the time of the oil embargo in 1973, GM cars averaged
152. L. WHITE, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SINCE 1945, at 178-85 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as WHITE].
153. Id.
154. Id. at 187-88.
155. Id.
156. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, OCT. 1967, at 13.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 12. About 960,000 imports were sold in the 12 months ending September 1968,
as compared with 740,000 in the preceding year. Id.
159. Id. at 13. As the 1969 model year opened, the car manufacturers announced renewed
plans to produce small cars to compete with the imports. Id.
160. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, MAY 1970, at 4.
161. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 112 (1974). The figures given in the tables therein
are for 1972. For the first nine months of 1973 the U.S. share of total world oil imports was
19%. Id. at 116.
162. The market share of small cars continued to grow from 1970-1973. U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, MAY 1974, pt. 1, at 5. In 1973, the Society of
Automotive Engineers, in a pre-oil embargo study, found that American cars had continually
increased in weight. A typical standard car increased from 3,550 pounds in 1965 to 4,275
pounds in 1973, resulting in a decrease in gas mileage of 21%. MacDonald, Fuel Consumption
Trends in Today's Vehicles, in 1973 ENERGY AND THE AUTOMOBILE 22 (Society of Automotive
Engineers, Inc.). The Society further noted that "the small-car trend [is] still gaining momen-
tum . . .[We] see a continuation of the trend to smaller cars and are planning accordingly."
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lower gas mileage than those of any other American automaker.'6 3 Between
1962 and 1972, General Motors' share of the new car market had fallen
from 51.9% to 44.2% primarily due to the sale of imports, which "did not
greatly trouble GM." 1" Industry observers noted that GM had decided to
stay in the "highly profitable big-car market, rather than compete head-on
in the less profitable small-car field." '' 6  During the same period, Ford's
market share fell by only two percent, while Chrysler's rose, as each ad-
justed more quickly than GM to the changing times.'"
Thus the oil embargo only accelerated a trend that had been visible for
years. American automakers had been planning to compete with the im-
ports since at least the 1950's, but until 1968 American cars were not
technologically different from the 1946 models.' 7 In 1981, President Carter
stated in his annual economic report that finally "competition on the basis
of technological advances and fuel economy is replacing competition based
on style and performance .... Vehicles manufactured according to stringent
quality standards . ..are replacing vehicles whose style changed annually
but whose technology evolved more slowly.' 618 Style changes were more
profitable and less risky than technological developments.
It has been nine years since the 1973 oil embargo, and GM has yet to
replace its inadequate facilities. Not until 1977 did the car companies begin
an extensive "downsizing" program to reduce the size of their cars.' 6 9 In
Id. at 23. In 1967, formerly optional equipment, including automatic transmission, power
steering, and power brakes, became standard on many models. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, OCT. 1967, at 12. All of these now standard items further
reduced the gas mileage of American cars. Orski, The Potential for Fuel Conservation: The
Case of the Automobile, OECD OBSERVER, Feb. 1974, at 13, 17. The use of automatic
transmission can produce a loss in fuel economy of over 10%, although the penalty increases
considerably in the case of heavier cars equipped with emission controls. Furthermore, air con-
ditioning results in an average fuel economy penalty of 9% and can reach as high as 20% in
city driving in hot weather. Id.
163. Burck, How G.M. Turned Itself Around, FORTUNE, Jan. 16, 1978, at 87. In 1973, the
average gas mileage of a typical GM car was 12 miles per gallon. Id.
164. Id. at 88. Following "strictly financial logic," GM concluded that it should "stick with
its traditional policies, which had earned it dominance of the highly profitable big-car
market." Id.
165. Id. The author notes that one executive told a reporter that, " 'there's something
wrong with people who like small cars.' " Id.
166. Id.
167. WHITE, supra note 150, at 211.
168. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 123 (1981).
169. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, SEPT. 1977, at 4. "Downsiz-
ing" is the reduction of the size and weight of a car without affecting its interior size. The
ability to do so destroys the argument that the American buyer needed the extra room which
large cars supposedly provided. At the same time, the Department of Commerce abandoned its
previous classification of automobiles into "short, medium, and long" (before that it had used
"low weight, low-medium, high-medium, and high weight") in favor of "subcompact, com-
pact, intermediate, and full-size." Thus, the unfavorable connotations of the higher categories
were removed; instead, it was made to sound as if the largest cars were actually only
"full-size," or normal, while smaller cars were something less than full.
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the meantime, they continued to produce big cars until 1979 when the sec-
ond sudden increase in oil prices and subsequent gas shortage again led to a
precipitous decline in sales of larger models.' Meanwhile, small cars had
increased their market share to 56.5% in 1975, and intermediate cars in-
creased their share to 28% in 1977.7
At least by the early 1970's GM was on notice that the nature of its com-
petition had changed. Instead of meeting this competition, it precipitated its
own decline and Detroit's along with it, and has now condemned land for
facilities it might have acquired on its own years before. GM resisted the in-
evitable until its failures became too burdensome. Then, in 1980, suddenly in
a rush, GM provided Detroit a deadline of May 1, 1981 for conveyance of
suitable land. Detroit hurriedly complied.
GM's own creation of its need for eminent domain was not an issue in
Poletown, nor is it likely to have changed the result. But once more, the
unspoken issue is whether the proposed condemnor's responsibility for
economic decline and loss of employment should enter into the court's
balance. The record well substantiates the dissent's contention that GM, in
operation of its new plant, will be motivated not by reference to the rate of
regional unemployment, but by profit.' 7 1 In the past, profit-motivated en-
tities have been delegated eminent domain rights only because their opera-
tion was directly in the public interest. GM's apparent reference to profit,
however, was not always in the best interests of the society that has vested
GM with the "high and dangerous" privilege'7 3 of eminent domain, except
to the extent that that society was the "incidental beneficiary" of GM's
successes. The court could hardly admit to this turnaround. But when the
past is ignored, so is the potential for abuse of a nominally public power.
As the dissent in Poletown emphasized, Detroit was a deteriorating city
which could not withstand the pressure exerted by the "immense political
and economic power" wielded by the giant General Motors. '7
The failure of earlier courts to consider size when granting eminent do-
main powers is not a persuasive reason for ignoring size in Poletown. The
early courts ignored size because enterprises were small. Under the mill acts,
170. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, OCT. 1979, at 21. The
market share of full-size cars fell gradually from 38.5% to 3306 before the gasoline shortage,
then to 20.5% in 1975, before rising to 24% in 1977. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF
CURRENT BUSINESS, SEPT. 1977, at 5.
171. Small cars increased their market share from 40.5% in 1971 to 56.5% in 1975, while in-
termediates increased their share from 21% in 1971 to 28% in 1977. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, SEPT. 1977, at 5.
172. 410 Mich. 616, 679, 304 N.W.2d 455, 480 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
173. Kinney v. Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173 Ind. 252, 255, 90 N.E. 129, 130 (1909) (ap-
propriation of a right of way by a utility for the purpose of constructing a side railroad track
not within purview of state statute permitting utilities limited eminent domain powers).
174. 410 Mich. 616, 679, 304 N.W.2d 455, 467 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting). In 1980, GM
was the third largest industrial corporation in the nation ranked by sales, second by assets, and
first by number of employees. Worthy, The 500: Fortune Directory of The Largest U.S. In-
dustrial Corporations, FORTUNE, May 4, 1981, at 324-25.
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all size mills were allowed the privilege of flooding their neighbors' land."
Manufacturing concerns were quite small at first, and in the early 1800's,
no firm controlled as much as ten percent of the output of a product.' 76
After 1850, even as industry and its use of eminent domain grew, the size
and power of firms could not compare to that of today's.'
The concentration of industry accelerated after 1900. In 1909, the largest
100 firms engaged in manufacturing, mining, and distribution owned 17.7%
of the assets of all such firms. By 1929, the largest 100 firms controlled
25.5% of all assets, and by 1958, 29.8%.78 By 1930, the 200 largest
manufacturing and transportation firms produced over half of the goods
and services in those industries.'
79
In manufacturing alone, the growth and concentration has been even
more striking. By 1968, the largest 100 manufacturing firms held a larger
share of the market than the 200 largest in 1950. The share of those 200
largest firms increased from fifty-seven percent in 1966 to sixty-one percent
just two years later.' 0 In 1973, there were 136 manufacturing corporations
with assets over a billion dollars, which together held fifty-three percent of
the assets of all industrials.' 8 ' By 1980, there were 244, which controlled
sixty-four percent of all such assets.' 2
As these manufacturing corporations exert increasing influence and con-
trol over cities with decreasing options, the danger exists that they will be
able to write their own terms in a condemnation as GM did in Poletown.
Control by any government entity over such corporate behemoths seems im-
possible. Yet control by public authority over the development of a project
generally has been considered crucial to condemnations on behalf of private
parties.' 83  For example, in Prince George's County v. Collington
Crossroads, Inc.,'84 the court emphasized that the county would retain
significant control over the industrial park to be created by eminent do-
main, thus assuring that it would serve the public interest. GM, by contrast,
presented Detroit with the criteria for its site, and the majority never ad-
dressed the control issue.
175. See generally NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.623.
176. JOHNSON & KROOS, supra note 28, at 192.
177. In the 1970's, the two largest manufacturing firms had greater sales per year than all
manufacturing corporations in 1900, even adjusting for inflation. Mueller, Conglomerates: A
Nonindustry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 443 (W. Adams ed. 5th ed. 1977).
178. Collins & Preston, The Size and Structure of the Largest Industrial Firms, 1909-1958,
51 AM. ECON. REV. 986, 989 (1961).
179. JOHNSON & KROOS, supra note 28, at 192.
180. Mueller, Conglomerates: A Nonindustry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
443 (W. Adams ed. 5th ed. 1977).
181. FTC Q. FINANCIAL REP. MANU. CORP. 4 TH QUARTER 1973, at 61 (1973).
182. FTC Q. FINANCIAL REP. MANU. CORP. 4TH QUARTER 1980, at 17 (1980).
183. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal.2d 52, 279 P.2d 529
(1955), where the court denied a condemnation for a parking garage to be constructed and
leased by private parties. The city would not have had the control over the facility necessary to
assure that it would be operated in the public interest.
184. 275 Md. 171, 180, 339 A.2d 278, 283 (1975).
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Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Authority'" first posed
the dilemma cities face today. The lone dissenter contended that New York,
in its desire to reverse the decline of its relative economic position on the
East Coast, was stigmatizing "the small or not so small entrepreneur as
standing in the way of progress. . . ."' The majority, which relied on the
slum clearance cases, failed even to note that the area discarded in favor of
the World Trade Center was an economically vibrant small business district.
The Port Authority's brief emphasized the number and size of the import-
export firms it hoped to attract, which included a share of the 2,900 United
States manufacturers then responsible for seventy-six percent of American
exports. "'
But the dilemma faced in Poletown was far more stark. It involved but
one giant corporation already dominant in Detroit which, by leaving, could
bankrupt a city already near insolvency. In truth, the city, and the court,
may have had no realistic choice. This is precisely the danger that cities to-
day must confront. Simply because of its size and power, GM was able to
create and hold the hope for relief of Detroit's crisis. Size was in fact the
only real criterion involved. 8' Justice Fitzgerald's fear that Poletown meant
there is "virtually no limit to the use of condemnation to aid private
businesses""' needs an addendum-so long as the private business is large
and powerful enough. The majority acknowledged as much in its declara-
tion that a condemnation would not be accepted simply because it may pro-
vide "some jobs" or add to the industrial or commercial base.
In the short run the project should benefit Detroit-disregarding the
demise of a community-by providing employment. But Detroit long ago
sacrificed its autonomy and relinquished control over its own fate, and in
Poletown it simply enshrined that choice. Thus, the long range outlook is
less certain. As industrial corporations grow ever greater and industrial
cities ever weaker, so is the outlook for private property rights.
WHAT Is To BE DONE?
The Public Corporation
The ever increasing power, strength, and size of huge corporations such
as GM, together with court decisions such as Poletown, may indicate that
individual property rights are becoming increasingly susceptible to infringe-
ment. Today's large corporations affect the lives of thousands of individuals
185. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (eminent domain usage was permitted
even though only incidental public revenue was raised through development), appeal dismissed,
375 U.S. 78, rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 960 (1963).
186. Id. at 399, 190 N.E.2d at 411, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 14 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 393-94, 190 N.E.2d at 408, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
188. The shoe factory, which the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine would not condemn,
would hardly have had such power. Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 446, 131 A.2d 904,
907 (1957).
189. 410 Mich. 616, 644, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464 (1981) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
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and determine the fate of cities. Detroit's decline although extreme, only
echoes the demise of older industrial cities throughout the northeastern
United States. Since the 1950's, even as the economy grew, industry has
relocated in the South and Southwest amid cries of an urban crisis.
Thirty years ago the crisis was only impending; now it is threatening to
engulf an entire region. As long as no solution is found to resurrect north-
eastern cities, the overconfident Sun Belt cannot be considered immune
from the same fate. What is to be done? How can these corporations be
forced to recognize the responsibilities which they owe to the cities they
abandon and the public they desert unemployed?
The separation of corporate power from corporate responsibility to the
public may be traced to the corporate managers, who may or may not live
in a city, and who may or may not care about the effects of their decisions
on the city's fate. It is they who determine whether the nation's largest
metropolitan areas shall prosper or perish. Accountable only to anonymous
stockholders, they wield the power of a government while serving an invisi-
ble constituency. Only the sacredness of a Lockeian conception of private
property permits the arbitrary exercise of a power so vast.
In 1689 John Locke proposed that by adding his labor to the land, he
claimed it as his own. In the early stages of capitalism, when small com-
panies were owned and managed by a few entrepreneurs, capitalists could
justifiably appropriate this theory of property for the emerging corporate
law. Locke's earth is far removed, however, from the intangible rights,
evidenced by a certificate, which the inert shareholder retains in the modern
corporation.
The obsolescence of this legal and economic theory was recognized fifty
years ago when Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means published The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.'90 Berle and Means asserted that, in the
case of the giant corporation, the classical "atom of property" had been
split. No longer did the same person own property and control its disposi-
tion. Instead, titular ownership was vested in great numbers of stockholders
able to exert little or no influence over a management group which might
own little if any stock themselves. Separation of ownership and control was
complete in huge corporations. For example, in 1932 the largest shareholder
of American Telephone & Telegraph Company owned less than one percent
of the company's stock. 9' It was this separation that permitted massive ag-
gregations of property.
Thus, the private corporation evolved into a "quasi-public" entity.' 92 No
longer do the owners of an enterprise control the means of production; nor
do those in control benefit directly when the enterprise is profitable. The
rise of the giant corporation "destroys the very foundation on which the
190. A. BERLE, JR. & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
191. Id. at 4-5.
192. Id. at 5.
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economic order of the past three centuries has rested." '93 To Berle and
Means, the effect of this "revolution" was clear: the corporation must be
analyzed not as a business enterprise but as a social organization with
power comparable to that of the state. 9 ' The stockholders, by surrendering
responsibility for the property, relinquished the right to have the corpora-
tion operated solely in their interest. The quasi-public corporation instead
encompasses the economic interests of the investing public, the workers,
and the consumers of its products, as well as those who control the cor-
poration. Consequently, the owner of neither half of the severed atom can
stand inviolate against the "paramount interests of the community."' 95
The economist John Kenneth Galbraith asks whether a firm such as
Lockheed, which does most of its business with the government, has its
working capital supplied by the government, has its cost overruns socialized
by the government, and has been rescued from disaster by the government,
is not properly viewed as a public entity."' That such firms are subject to
the forces of the market-the theoretical justification for continuing to view
them as private-few would seriously contend. Lockheed is but the extreme
case. General Motors unilaterally sets the prices for its cars, dictates car
design and employment contracts, and influences highway construction, all
with "profound public effect." In fact, its public decisions in any year are
"far more consequential than those of any state legislature."',9
Corporate planners, not the market, determine the prices, costs, and level
of production of today's giant corporations. Industrial planning, akin to
the state's authoritative decisions in noncapitalist economies, has replaced
the free enterprise system. The multinational firm has much more in com-
mon with the socialist state than with the pin factory of Adam Smith.' 98
The public corporations also are largely subsidized by the government.
Massive government expenditures, first introduced as state policy after the
Depression, ensure a high level of demand for their products.' 9 9 In addi-
tion, direct governmental outlays to business result in a system of "sub-
sidized, and risk-underwritten private enterprise." 2 ' In 1975, the federal
government provided thirty-seven percent of the funding for industrial
research and development."0 ' Corporate giants are the primary beneficiaries
of such governmental largesse, as forty-three percent of this money went to
companies with over 25,000 employees, and a full twenty-one percent to the
193. Id. at 8.
194. Id. at 352.
195. Id. at 352-56.
196. Galbraith, On the Economic Image of Corporate Enterprise, in CORPORATE POWER IN
AMERICA 4 (R. Nader & M. Green ed. 1973).
197. Id. at 5-6.
198. See generally J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (3d ed. rev. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as GALBRAITH].
199, Id. at 230-42.
200. E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 167 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
HERMAN].
201. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRY, 1975, at 2
(1976).
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four firms with the largest research and development programs in the coun-
try.
202
Defense spending is the major element of this business-government part-
nership. The Department of Defense provided two-thirds of all federal
funds for research and development awarded to industry in 1975.23 Military
production has been largely contracted out to private industry, thus under-
writing the risk of undertaking advanced technological development."0 '
Traditional roles are now reversed. Risk has been transferred from the
private sector to the government while business has become the state's
weapons producer, leading to reduced research and production capability
on the part of the military." 5 Supplying a military force is uniquely
characteristic of the state, but neither Adam Smith nor several generations
of his descendants could have foreseen a concern as vast and powerful as
General Motors.10 6
Possible Solutions: Making Public Corporations Accountable
Corporations have increasingly deserted Northern cities for the South's
promise of endless sun, industrial peace, and lower wages. Large firms have
taken advantage of their great flexibility to abandon local workers and
communities °.2 7 Left in the wake of these desertions are the unemployed,
their own fate determined by the corporation they once served. Gurney
Breckenfeld described Detroit as a city with "numerous [empty] factories
built as recently as the 1940's and 1950's, . . . the atmosphere is almost
sepulchral, an eerie compound of emptiness and half-hidden menace.
Downtown has become a hollow core pocked by vacant stores and boarded-
up taverns.202" Elsewhere scenes are similar if not quite so bleak.20 9
202. Id. at 6-7.
203. Id. at 3.
204. GALBRAITH, supra note 198, at 239-40. Between 1960 and 1975, more than $450 billion
in prime military contracts were awarded to private business. K. SALE, POWER SHIFT 24 (1975).
205. HERMAN, supra note 200, at 166 (citing H. NIEBURG, IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE (1966)).
206. With gross receipts approximately equal to Sweden's gross national product; with
employees and their families about as large as the total population of New
Zealand; with outlays larger than those of the central government of France or
West Germany, wholly dependent for its survival ...on a vast network of laws,
protections, services, inducements, constraints, and coercions provided by in-
numerable governments, federal, state, local, foreign, General Motors is de facto
the public's business.
R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 120 (1970).
207. HERMAN, supra note 200, at 261.
208. Breckenfeld, Refilling the Metropolitan Doughnut, in THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT CITIES
233 (D. Perry & A. Watkins ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Breckenfeld]. Many businesses have
traveled only the short distance to the suburbs. The Detroit suburb of Southfield alone has ac-
quired, at the city's expense: Bendix, Federal-Mogul, Macabees Mutual Life Insurance,
Michigan Bell, the Eaton Corporation, IBM, Xerox, Levitt and Sons, SCM, State Farm
Mutual, Allstate, Honeywell, Enjay Chemical, Control Data, Sperry Rand, Reynolds
Aluminum, and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. C. LARSON & S. NIKKEL, URBAN PROB-
LEMS 121 (1979) [hereinafter cited as LARSON & NIKKEL].
209. For example, in 1970, 43 firms left St. Louis for the suburbs. In just two years, Boston
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Can a solution be found? In many areas the service sector has grown
even as the manufacturing sector has declined, and some see the growth of
services as the answer to a declining industrial base. The economies of
younger, more prosperous cities are far more service-oriented than those of
their aged brethren. 2 But the service sector is comprised largely of low-
paying, low-skilled jobs disproportionately held by minorities and the poor.
Although these are the groups most in need of aid, we must ask whether we
wish to enforce a dual economy. Moreover, services, historically less sensitive
to the business cycle than manufacturing, also have become cyclically
unstable in older areas."' As the service sector employs an increasingly
larger percentage of the work force, this trend is likely to accelerate; it is
difficult to envision an American appetite so vast as to provide continuous
employment for a nation of McDonald's hamburger servers, busily scoop-
ing beef patties into ever-widening jaws.
Many analysts have suggested that an attempt be made to reclaim the ur-
ban industrial sector. They suggest a "business-government partnership"
whereby cities make it as attractive as possible for corporations to do
business within their borders. Cities are advised to provide wage subsidies
for firms hiring the unemployed. 2 Abandoning "ill-conceived taxes"
which provide "businesses and the affluent an incentive to leave" the city"1 3
and allowing corporate tax incentives will encourage businesses to remain. " "
Finally cities must tailor their administrative regulations to serve corporate
needs.2 5
More drastic measures also may be needed to entice new businesses into
urban areas. Some analysts propose that corporations be given traditional
municipal powers, including "land assembly ...zoning, with the ability to
influence local zoning ordinances or even [the ability] to develop special in-
dustrial districts ... bonding, with the power to issue tax exempt bonds...
[and] the capacity to design, develop, and . . . operate necessary
services." 2 6 Although cities may be unwilling to cede certain municipal
lost 75 companies to suburbia. LARSON & NIKKEL, supra note 208, at 121 (citing Cassidy, Mov-
ing to the Suburbs, THE NEw REPUBLIC, June 22, 1972, at 21). Other older cities have suffered
similar losses.
210. Harrison & Hill, The Changing Structure of Jobs in the Older Cities, in CENTRAL CITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 33 (B. Chinitz ed. 1979).
211. Id. at 27-28.
212. Chinitz, Toward a National Urban Policy, in CENTRAL CITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
8 (B. Chinitz ed. 1979).
213. Breckenfeld, supra note 208, at 250.
214. Schwartz, The Scope for Local Government Action, in CENTRAL CITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 166 (B. Chinitz ed. 1979).
215. Id. at 168. Schwartz asserts that regulations should fit the needs of the corporate
"client." She suggests as a solution that the state become, if not the executive committee of
the bourgeoisie, at least the executive committee of the business world. What Marx asserted
was true one hundred years ago, and capitalists have vehemently denied ever since, she pro-
poses as a solution.
216. Starr, Economic Development Strategies-No. 1: Industrial Preservation, NATION'S
CITIES, April, 1978, at 24.
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functions, urban governments must "stop asking companies to stay in
[their] cities and start making it in their best interest to do so.''2"
Such proposals clearly illuminate the public nature of the corporation and
the subservient position of the city. When corporations are given tax incen-
tives and subsidies, control over a city's land use policies, and partnership
status with local officials to determine governmental regulations, the myth
of private enterprise must surely fall. Corporations should not be given
public powers such as GM received in Poletown without accepting the ac-
companying public responsibility. Incentives offered in the hope of enticing
industry result in a competition for survival with the most beneficent
metropolis emerging as the fittest. This scenario may be appropriate in an
air fare war among international airlines; it is hardly a compelling way to
determine a nation's urban future.
With incentives to lure corporations into economically depressed areas,
the financial risk normally associated with the private sector is safely
transferred to the public. There is no guarantee that industry once attracted
to a city will remain, and the promise of more jobs may well prove
ephemeral. A competitor need only raise the stakes to lure a corporation
away, while the corporate operations are, in the interim, almost wholly
underwritten by public funds. For example, in order to remain in Detroit,
General Motors required the city to "provide for the construction and
upgrading of site perimeter roads" at a cost of $23.5 million, to absorb a
$3.5 million penalty for using underground utility service instead of
overhead service, and to bear the expense of disposing of toxic wastes
found on the site. 2 8 The project cost Detroit over $200 million, while the
property was sold to GM for only $8 million."1 9
Other automobile companies had already built plants in the southern
United States and General Motors again was threatening to build in the Sun
Belt. GM therefore was granted a public power to alleviate the unemploy-
ment for which it was largely responsible. The automaker's history of ig-
noring the public good peculiarly demonstrates the need to redefine the
nature of the corporation so that power and responsibility are once more
merged.
In 1964, Berle asserted that all power must be based on legitimacy, to
which corporations had but "the slenderest claim. ' 220 Of the three sum-
mary points to this argument, the third, that "[g]reat corporate power is ex-
ercised in relation to certain obligations," including the obligation to pro-
vide "at least some continuity of employment," was "destined to be in in-
217. Id.
218. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 656, 304 N.W.2d
455, 469 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 656, 304 N.W.2d at 469 (Ryan, J., dissenting). GM also was granted the max-
imum allowable tax abatement for 12 years. Id. at 657, 304 N.W.2d at 470 (Ryan, J., dissen-
ting).
220. Berle, Economic Power and the Free Society, in THE CORPORATION TAKEOVER 91, 103
(A. Hacker ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Berle].
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finitely greater controversy" than the first two.22 ' This hesitant statement,
scarcely less controversial now, is an indication that the obligations a cor-
poration owes to the public have remained undefined since the incipiency of
corporate political power. It is time to recognize that the hesitancy of
Berle's statement is its only failing.
When corporations are given public powers to provide employment, they
accordingly have an obligation to provide such employment. Their fulfill-
ment of this obligation must not be left to individual caprice. If a
neighborhood is destroyed so that 6,000 can work for GM, then GM must
create and guarantee 6,000 jobs. Unless it does so, GM's claim to
legitimacy fails. The court can and should require GM to guarantee these
jobs before granting it the eminent domain power or other public rights.
Requiring these guarantees, however, might only drive GM southward.
Thus corporate obligations must be the same in Houston; for Houston shall
not forever prosper, and some unknowable years from now will despair for
having learned so little from Detroit today. Great corporations cannot be
allowed to abandon a city arbitrarily, solely in the interest of their
stockholders. Given their flexibility, such corporations now have "a struc-
tural bias toward irresponsibility, in the sense of a greater capability of ex-
ternalization of social costs through abandonment." '222 If they do relocate,
they must compensate the abandoned city for the increased unemployment
and welfare and the decrease in the tax base. Since businesses routinely pay
relocation expenses of their executives, they should be required to do the
same for any workers who wish to remain with them. The alternative is a
desperate city, totally dependent upon a corporation for its future as an ur-
ban center.223
Corporations also must provide greater job security against downturns in
the business cycle. The employer's apparently indisputable right to reduce
the work force whenever business falls need not be sacrosanct. Most other
industrialized nations provide greater protection against unjust dismissal
221. Id. at 105. Berle listed other obligations, including the need for the corporation to sup-
ply the demand in the area of its production, to establish a price which would not be con-
sidered extortionate, and to give continuing attention to the technical progress of the art.
222. HERMAN, supra note 200, at 261. The author notes that this is "the logical outcome of
the workings of a market that is efficient in the private but not in a social sense." Id.
223. J. WRIGHT, ON A CLEAR DAY YOU CAN SEE GENERAL MOTORS 226-27 (1979). The case
is described by John DeLorean, former vice-president of General Motors, where in the early
1970's GM built two new assembly plants in the South, despite Detroit's offer of cheap land
and pleas for relief of its automobile industry-induced crisis. DeLorean tells of a proposal for
one plant to be built in Detroit and one in Pontiac, which was similarly depressed. He
presented GM's top management with "compelling financial reasons" for construction in
Detroit: cheap urban renewal land, a pool of skilled workers, and cheaper shipping costs. A
similar case was made for Pontiac. In addition, he argued that General Motors had a social
obligation to the city since the automobile industry had caused its depression. With no
"serious consideration" of his case, the plants were built in Memphis, Tennessee and
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
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and economic layoffs.22 In Japan-which the American automobile in-
dustry is admonished to emulate and to which it now compares
itself-workers for most medium and large firms customarily are hired for
lifetime employment, gaining tenure after a one-year probation period."
They are dismissed thereafter only for good cause and are generally not
subject even to temporary layoffs, which are exceptional. Employment
security for employees of Japanese firms is one of the principal-and
publicly acknowledged-concerns of corporate management.226
That concern was demonstrated during the 1971 recession. Many
Japanese firms laid off workers but guaranteed them eighty to one hundred
percent of their wages. In the less severe recession of 1974, workers in
Japanese firms were guaranteed ninety percent of their salaries while on
layoff.227 Reduced working hours and overtime also limit the effects of
recession and spread its costs more thinly across the Japanese labor force.22
In 1974, legislation was passed in Japan providing government subsidies to
firms which do not dismiss employees during business slumps. Firms which
have undergone a production decline of over twenty percent from the
previous year qualify for subsidies of one-half of wages for large firms and
two-thirds for small and medium-sized companies. 9 Government and in-
dustry share the burden of retaining employees, and the incentive to lay off,
so strong in the United States, is greatly mitigated.
Modern researchers dispute earlier conclusions that the Japanese system is
based on traditional social norms and cannot be duplicated elsewhere. They
argue that lifetime employment became widespread only after World War I,
when Japanese workers sought protection in the face of a large excess of
labor, and has survived because of its economic benefits to worker and
firm.23 All credit the fierce loyalty of Japanese workers primarily to in-
dustry's commitment to job security.
An American comparison may be the longshoremen's contract in New
York and New Jersey, which guarantees workers compensation for 2,080
hours of work a year until retirement age.23 ' Such a commitment in this
224. R. COLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION 257 (1979) [hereinafter cited as COLE].
The author notes that "[ilt is one of the minor ironies of our times that foreign firms increas-
ingly treat us as an underdeveloped nation." Absence of worker protection in the United States
serves as an incentive to locate plants here.
225. Galenson & Odaka, The Japanese Labor Market, in ASIA's NEW GIANT 614 (H. Patrick
& H. Rosovsky ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Galenson & Odaka]. Japanese workers generally
join a firm after graduation from high school and remain with it until retirement at age 55.
Only the minority of workers who work for the larger concerns are covered under the system.
Women and temporary employees are also generally excluded.
226. Pucik, Lifetime Employment in Japan.: An Alternative to the "Culture-Structure"
Casual Model, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 158, 159 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Pucik].
227. Galenson & Odaka, supra note 225, at 617.
228. COLE, supra note 224, at 256.
229. Id. at 256, 258-59.
230. See, e.g., Galenson & Odaka, supra note 225, at 614; Pucik, supra note 226, at 159-60.
231. COLE, supra note 224, at 260.
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highly volatile industry ultimately may lead to similar agreements in other
cyclically-sensitive industries, such as the auto industry. Permanent employ-
ment, involving a lifelong commitment by both parties, will not arise in this
country by custom alone.232
The low employee mobility within the Japanese system may in any case
be less desirable in the United States. In practice, however, many workers
do not change jobs, and the incentive to stay put would surely increase with
the employer's guarantee of job security and a higher quality of work life.
Employment need not be lifelong, however, in order to be secure. "[Tihe
anachronistic practice of making selected workers arbitrarily vulnerable to
protracted periods of unemployment" '233 must be discarded. The social and
psychological costs of losing one's job, even temporarily, cannot be ig-
nored. If General Motors is obliged to retain employees on the payroll, it
may not be so complacent about its declining market. Contractual com-
mitments are significant steps toward a modern theory of employment. But
so long as they preserve the outdated notion of corporate autonomy, they
are nothing more.
CONCLUSION
As the corporation is the center of the economic life, so is the city the
heart of the civic. Like so much else, this too has been forgotten. We are
told to implement the appropriate management techniques, to operate our
cities like successful corporations, and only secondarily, if then, to recall
why they exist. We are reminded that "the protean force that shapes cities
is self-interest-of individuals and companies."
'1
34
But that is the past. Corporate self-interest has helped destroy twentieth-
century cities. The private sector, as long as it is regarded as private, will
not now rescue them.13 We must reverse our perspective. We must not run
232. This commitment to assure that auto workers are secure in their employment is
evidenced by the recent tentative agreement reached between GM and the United Auto
Workers. Under the agreement, GM's employees will receive profit-sharing starting in 1983,
guaranteed income for laid-off workers with 10 years' seniority and experimental plant pro-
grams where 80% of the work force are guaranteed lifetime job security. Furthermore, it is
estimated that GM will save $2.5 billion by reason of the agreement. Chicago Sun-Times,
March 22, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
233. COLE, supra note 224, at 260.
234. Breckenfeld, supra note 208, at 246.
235. Historian Sam Bass Warner has poignantly recognized the need for a new approach:
Under the American tradition, the first purpose of the citizen is the private
search for wealth; the goal of a city is to be a community of private money
makers. Once the scope of many city dwellers' search for wealth exceeded the
bounds of the municipality, the American city ceased to be an effective communi-
ty. Ever afterwards it lacked the desire, the power, the wealth, and the talent
necessary to create a humane environment for all its citizens. From that first mo-
ment of bigness, from about the mid-nineteenth century onward, the successes and
failures of American cities have depended upon the unplanned outcomes of the
private market. The private market's demand for workers, its capacities for
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cities as businesses, but instead we must recognize that corporations have
become social institutions. The Hellenic concept of a city as a community
with an active body politic and spirited public life must be revived. 3 ' Great
multinational corporations have only broken such traditional community
links.23 '
Clearly more is necessary than simply to redefine corporate legal respon-
sibilities. Our failure yet to have done so is but a symptom of a greater
failure of social consciousness. Even so, the recognition of the proper place
in society of the most powerful organism of our time will not be without
further effect. Berle cogently recognized this too: "Their [corporate] power
can enslave us beyond present belief, or perhaps set us free beyond present
imagination." 23' Let us hope we have not already made our choice.
dividing land, building houses, stores and factories, and its needs for public ser-
vices have determined the shape and quality of America's big cities. What the
private market could do well American cities have done well, what the private
market did badly, or neglected, our cities have been unable to overcome.
The twentieth-century failure of urban America to create a humane environment
is thus the story of an enduring tradition of privatism in a changing world.
Warner, Preface to S. WARNER, JR., THE PRIVATE CITY, at x-xi (1968).
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237. See HERMAN, supra note 200, at 301. Where cities have revived, the revival has been
based on "great wealth amassed elsewhere," resulting in "the transformation of the nation's
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Jan., 1979, at 27.
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